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LABOR RELATIONS IN THE NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE: A MODEL OF
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING?
MATHIEU FOURNIER*
DOMINIc Roux**
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports leagues make up a world of their own in which the best
athletes, employed by various teams, display their talents before thousands of
spectators. The National Hockey League (NHL) is undoubtedly the most
popular professional sports league in Canada.
The NHL is composed of thirty teams, six in Canada and twenty-four in
the United States' that compete every year for the Stanley Cup, the archetypal
dream of every professional hockey player. Since it was created in 1917,2 the
NHL has grown into an industry that generates billions of dollars in revenues,
which are shared by a handful of players and franchise owners across North
America.
Given the billions of dollars involved from revenues generated by
spectator ticket sales, television rights, and the sale of related products, the
* Mathieu Fournier is a lawyer in the province of Quebec.
** Dominic Roux is a professor in the Faculty of Law at Universit6 Laval and a researcher at the
Inter-University Research Centre on Globalization and Work (CRIMT). Research for this article was
supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) grant under
the research project entitled "Legal Pluralism and Labour Law" led by professor Michel Coutu at
Universit6 de Montrdal. We would like to offer our sincere thanks to Daniel Dumais, a lawyer at
Heenan Blaikie Aubut, as well as Professor Pierre Verge, from the Faculty of Law at Universitd
Laval, for having so generously agreed to review a preliminary version of our article. The opinions
put forward in this article are those of its two authors only and do not in any way represent the views
of McCarthy T~trault LLP. A French version of this text was initially published in Qudbec under the
following reference: Mathieu Fournier et Dominic Roux, Les Relations de Travail dans la Ligue
Nationale de Hockey : tn Mod~le de Ngociation Collective Transnationale?, 49 LES CAHIERS DE
DROIT 481 (2008).
1. Nat'l Hockey League (NHL), Teams, NHL.coM, http://www.nhl.com/ice/teams/.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2008).
2. NHL, Hockey for Dummies, NHL.coM, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.nhl.com/ice/news/htm?
id=381958.
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NHL is now considered a major industry in which the players and the owners
compete for the largest market share. On the one hand, the owners have a
legitimate interest in making sure their teams remain profitable, and if that
proves to be impossible, to decide, in some cases, to move their franchises to
more lucrative markets or to sell to potential investors. 3 On the other hand,
the players' desire to secure the best possible annual salary is just as
legitimate, especially given that their careers are relatively short.4 To this end,
they are constantly seeking new ways to negotiate, to sell themselves more
effectively, and to ensure that the contracts they enter into are lucrative. 5
Conversely, the owners seek ways to increase their savings when it comes to
player salaries, with the goal of increasing their profit margins, or at the very
least, avoid going into deficit.
It was in the context of this ideological and economic confrontation that a
labor relations system was gradually and autonomously put in place; a system
that is quite novel, since it was set up outside of existing labor laws. This
system reached its full maturity in 2005 when the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) 6 came into effect following negotiations between the NHL
and the National Hockey League Players' Association (NHLPA). From the
mid-1990s, labor relations between the two parties had been rather strained,
leading to the first strike in the history of professional hockey in 1992, and to
the first lockout in 1994-1995. 7 This was followed by a second lockout in
2004-2005, this time leading to the cancellation of the entire hockey season,
including the playoffs, a first in the history of professional sports in North
America.8 This second lockout led to the signing of the CBA.
This sector-based collective agreement, which applies across North
America, unilaterally stipulates the great majority of working conditions for all
NHL players, regardless of the team for which they play. Moreover, it directly
regulates the negotiations of individual employment contracts between players
and teams by imposing a whole set of standards covering various aspects of
the employment relationship. 9
3. Melanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap
Systems, 10 SPORTs LAW. J. 189, 190 (2003).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See generally NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, COLLECTIvE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN TiHE NHL AND THE NHLPA (2005), available at http://www.nhlpa.com/About-Us/CBA/
[hereinafter CBA].
7. Aubut, supra note 3, at 194.
8. See generally Trois Mois de Lock-Out en 1994-1995, RADIO-CANADA.CA, http://archives.
radio-canada.ca/sports/hockey/clips/9066/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
9. See generally CBA, supra note 6.
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Beyond the curious fact that a team-the employer-has the right to trade
one of its own players-the employee-to another competing team without
this player having the right to oppose this decision,' 0 the system that has been
put in place is certainly of relevance to anyone with an interest in the theory of
labor law and the fundamental challenges it presently faces.
II. QUEBEC LABOR LAW
It should be noted that, historically, labor law, in particular that which is
applied in Quebec, was built on the basis of two distinct but interrelated sets of
rules.11  The first set, which mainly emerged in 1925, is characterized by
direct state intervention: that is to say that minimum working conditions began
at that time to be imposed for employees tied to their employer by an
employment contract. For example, the Act Respecting Labour Standards,
which is applied in particular to any employer doing business in Quebec,
stipulates the protection that will be provided to employees: minimum wage,
maximum working hours, annual leave, notice of termination, etc., making it
clear that these are minimum standards and that they are of public order. 12
The second set of rules is based on the principle of the "collective autonomy"
of the parties in an employment relationship: this refers to the collective
system of labor relations established in Quebec in 1944.13 In establishing this
system, the legislature was acknowledging a practice which already existed in
several workplaces; that is, employees were forming associations, and through
their unions, collectively bargaining to establish the details of collective
agreements, in the case where the employer freely accepted to enter into such
a bargaining process, or did so under constraint, following pressure tactics that
were effectively exerted by the employees. 14 This system is characterized by
some specific components, which are now consecrated in the Quebec Labour
Code. 15
First, employees, by majority vote, can choose a representative-the
union-that can be "certified" to become their exclusive representative with
regard to all aspects covered by the negotiation, application, and
10. Except in the case where a player's employment contract includes a non-trade clause. Id. at
art. 11.8.
11. FERNAND MORIN ET AL., LE DROIT DE L'EMPLOI AU QUEBEC 77 (3d ed. 2006); PIERRE
VERGE ET AL., LE DROIT DU TRAVAIL PAR SES SOURCES 29 (Editions Thrmis 2006).
12. Act Respecting Labour Standards, R.S.Q., ch. N.I-1, § 93 (2009).
13. See Quebec Leads Again, THE SHAWINIGAN STANDARD, Mar. 1, 1944, at 2.
14. See id.
15. See Quebec Labour Code, R.S.Q., ch. C-27 (2009).
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administration of the collective agreement; 16 in such a case, the parties will be
under the obligation to negotiate, diligently and in good faith, the conditions of
employment of employees forming a group within a given enterprise.17 Once
it has been concluded, the collective agreement sets out the conditions of
employment that will apply to all present and future employees included in the
group concerned, as well as to the employer, subject to public order. 18 Since
the right to strike and to a lockout can only be exercised during the negotiation
of the initial collective agreement or when this agreement comes up for
renewal, it follows that these pressure tactics remain prohibited during the
period of the collective agreement. 19 Lastly, arbitration is the exclusive and
compulsory means of settling grievances relating to the interpretation and
application of the collective agreement; consequently, the courts of law are
excluded from this adjudicating role. 20
These initial observations reveal the limitations of labor laws, which are
essentially applicable at the national, or even in the case of Canada, provincial
level. Such territoriality means that, with few exceptions, 21 such laws are
designed to apply at the local level only.22 The transnational dimension of the
employer's activities and of labor relations with employees is therefore not
addressed. For example, the collective system of labor relations is binding at
the level of a specified employer's enterprise. Certification is granted to one
association only with respect to a group of employees under one employer or
at a firm, branch, or department coming under this employer. 23 Multi-
employer certification is therefore prohibited. Moreover, only one collective
agreement governs the conditions of employment for this group of
employees. 24
In this era of trade globalization and internationalization, in which
transnational firms have become major players,25 the labor relations system
that has been established in the NHL presents a very interesting model of
transnational union representation and collective bargaining. This Article aims
to sketch only a broad outline of the main characteristics of this system, which
16. §§ 21, 47.2, 141.
17. §53.
18. §§62,67.
19. §§ 106, 107.
20. §§ 100, 101.
21. Act Respecting Labour Standards, ch. II.
22. PIERRE VERGE & SOPHIE DUFOUR, CONFIGURATION DIVERSIFItE DE L'ENTREPRISE ET
DROIT DU TRAVAIL 107 (2003).
23. Quebec Labour Code § 21.
24. § 67.
25. BOB HEPPLE, LABOR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 6 (2005).
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has made it possible to go beyond the inherent territoriality of labor law,
whether state-based or conventional, and the inherent limitations of its
effectiveness. Moreover, this system indisputably has transnational and multi-
employer normative import. Lastly, the binding effect and enforceability of its
rules are ensured by an arbitration mechanism binding the parties.
In addition, in regards to the theory of labor law, the system described
here involves many pertinent aspects worth reflecting upon. The system is,
first and foremost, a private initiative and is strictly contractual in nature. It is
essentially based on mutual will, as was typically the case, and will be seen as
this Article examines the era that preceded its adoption, starting in 1944, of the
laws that introduced collective labor relations systems in Canada. Thus, it fits
neatly into a "collective autonomy" approach, 26 at least in the sense intended
by the first major labor law theorists; that is, first, a group of workers
demanding better working conditions from their employer, and then, to legal
standards governing labor that are applicable to a given community, such as a
factory, plant, firm, or industry developed through "collective bargaining" and
set out in a "collective agreement" that then becomes "law" for the parties
concerned. 27 However, it is also possible to see in this system an example of
"legal pluralism:" 28 having been constructed, developed, and sanctioned
independently from the state, its norms and their effective implementation are
situated, definitively and almost exclusively, outside of state-based labor
laws. 29
That said, this system involves two levels of negotiation. Collective labor
relations take place at the sectoral level. The collective negotiation of working
conditions is definitely centralized, since it involves representatives of all the
parties concerned, that is, the team owners and NHL directors, as well as all of
the hockey players employed by any of these teams. The CBA, signed in 2005
as a result of this process, standardizes some working conditions for players
26. PIERRE VERGE & GUYLAINE VALLEE, UN DROIT DU TRAVAIL? ESSAI SUR LA SPECIFICITE DU
DROIT DU TRAVAIL 25-30 (1997).
27. Hugo Sinzheimer, La thgorie des sources et le droit ouvrier, LE PROBLtME DES SOURCES EN
DROIT POSITIF, 1934, at 73; see generally GEORGES GURVITH, LE TEMPS PRESENT ET L'IDtE DE
DROIT SOCIAL (1931); "Pensdes allemande et europdenne." Ulrich Zachert, La lggitimitI des
rapports juridiques de travail. A propos de la conception de la lkgitimrit chez Max Weber et Hugo
Sinzheimer, LA LEGITIMITE DE L'ETAT ET DU DROIT. AUTOUR DE MAX WEBER 306 (Michel Coutu &
Guy Rocher eds., 2005).
28. Guylaine Val6e, Le droit du travail comme lieu de pluralisme juridique, in CELINE SAINT-
PIERRE & JEAN-PHILIPPE WARREN, SOCIOLOGIE ET SOCIETE QUtBICOISE: PRESENCES DE GUY
ROCHER 241 (Cd1ine Saint-Pierre & Jean-Philippe Warren eds., 2006).
29. Id.; see generally Harry Arthurs, Labor Law Without the State?, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 1
(1996).
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across the NHL. 30 However, above all, it includes an innovative mechanism
for determining the salary that each team can pay its players, that is, a salary
cap. 31 This point will be elaborated on further in this Article. 32
As regards individual labor relations, these take place at the local level,
that is, at the level of the firm. Although, indeed, the CBA significantly
regulates the negotiation of the employment contract between the player and
the team, this negotiation remains decentralized and individual, taking place
between these two parties alone. If the parties reach a deadlock and if the
object of the negotiation involves determining the salary to be paid to the
player, the parties can, under certain circumstances, go to salary arbitration,
according to a sophisticated procedure that will be analyzed in detail further
on. The same is true for grievances concerning the interpretation or
application of the collective agreement or the individual employment
contract. 33
III. COLLECTIVE LABOR RELATIONS IN THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
The labor relations system that the NHL set up involves a centralized
multi-employer system for negotiating working conditions across North
America. 34 This collective bargaining process resulted in the signing of a new
collective agreement in 2005, which was intended, on the one hand, to
standardize some working conditions across the NHL, and on the other hand,
to harmonize the salary paid to players by instituting a salary cap. 35
A. Collective Bargaining of Working Conditions: A Centralized Multi-
Employer Process at the North American Level.
The main area of activity of the NHL involves producing and marketing
sports competitions engaged in by the NHL's teams. The preamble to the
2005 CBA states that the NHL is a "joint venture 36 organized as a not-for-
profit unincorporated association... which is recognized as the sole and
30. See generally CBA, supra note 6.
31. Id. at art. 42.
32. The CBA's innovative mechanism for determining the salary cap will be generally discussed
infra Part III.
33. Arbitration for both salary disagreements and grievances will be discussed infra Part IV.
34. The system for negotiating working conditions will be discussed infra Part IV.A.
35. The salary cap will be discussed infra Part IV.B.
36. A joint venture is "a business undertaking by two or more persons engaged in a single
defined project. The necessary elements are: (1) an express or implied agreement; (2) a common
purpose that the group intends to carry out; (3) shared profits and losses; and (4) each member's equal
voice in controlling the project." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (8th ed. 2004).
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exclusive bargaining representative of the present and future Clubs of the
NHL... ... 37 Thus, the NHL is a common legal entity that the team owners
created in order to set up a professional hockey league. It is also, according to
this definition, the exclusive representative of its present and future teams for
the purposes of collective labor negotiations with the NHLPA, and as such, it
closely resembles an employers' association as understood in Quebec labor
law. 38 In this respect, however, it should be pointed out that each individual
team remains the real employer of its players and that the ultimate power,
when it comes to negotiating, rests in the hands of the teams.
Lastly, having its head office in New York City, the NHL is directed and
supervised by a board of governors, made up of one member from each
team.39 The NHL grants franchises to team owners, bestowing upon them the
privilege of joining the other teams that make up the League. 40 The board of
governors decides to whom a franchise should be granted to and at what price,
as well as, when the case arises, whether a franchise can be sold or
relocated.41 The NHL also has the power to withdraw a franchise from its
owner if he does not respect his contractual obligations, violates NHL rules, or
is headed for bankruptcy. In this case, the NHL then decides to whom the
franchise can be sold to and where it can be relocated. 42
The NHLPA represents all NHL players.4 3  Its headquarters are in
Toronto and, in its present form, the NHLPA dates back to June 1967. 44 It all
began with a resolution by player representatives from the six original teams
who elected a Toronto Maple Leafs player, Bob Pulford, as the NHLPA's
president, and appointed Alan Eagleson, an influential player agent at the time,
as its executive director.41 According to the archives, on Eagleson's advice,
37. CBA, supra note 6, at pmbl.
38. "[E]mployers' association: a group organization of employers having as its objects the study
and safeguarding of the economic interests of its members, and particularly assistance in the
negotiation and application of collective agreements." Quebec Labour Code § 1(c).
39. National Hockey League, FUNDINGUNIVERSE.COM, http://www.fundinguniverse.com
company-histories/National-Hockey-League-Company-History.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
40. GIL STEIN, POWER PLAYS: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE BIG BUSINESS OF THE NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE 37 (1997).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. NHL Players Ass'n (NHLPA), About the NHLPA, NHLPA.COM, http://www.nhlpa.com/
About-Us (last visited Jan. 20, 2008) [hereinafter NHLPA].
44. Id.
41. Boston: Ed Johnston; Chicago: Pierre Pilote; Detroit: Norm Ullman; Montreal: Bobby
Rousseau and Jean-Claude Tremblay; New York: Rod Gilbert, Harry Howell and Bob Nevin;
Toronto: Bob Pulford. Heather Engel, History of NHLPA Executive Directors, SUITE101.CoM, Aug.
31, 2009, http://national-hockey-league-nhl.suite 101 .com/article/
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Pulford delivered an ultimatum to team owners at a meeting, declaring that if
they refused to recognize the new NHLPA, the players would join the
powerful Teamsters Union and seek certification under Canadian labor laws. 45
The owners were obviously against this proposal, but as pointed out by
one observer, the "notorious Teamsters Union was beginning to cause some
rumblings with the league, [so] Eagleson seemed to be the lesser of two
evils." 46 Consequently, the NHLPA was recognized by the team owners and
thus gained its present status as, to use the words of the CBA itself, "the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the present and future Players in the
NHL."47
It is interesting to note that the parties appear to have chosen a United
States law, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 48 to govern their labor
relations. 49 The United States Congress adopted this law in accordance with
its authority to govern trade between states, as set out in the United States
Constitution. 50 A National Labor Relations Board decision 5' established that
the NLRA has jurisdiction over and can be applied to professional sports
leagues in the United States, including the NHL. 52 By recognizing the
principle of freedom of association, 53 the NLRA not only allows players to
form their own association and negotiate their working conditions collectively,
but also implicitly, to exercise the right to strike, since it specifies that they
can engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining. 54 Moreover, the extraterritorial scope of this law leaves no doubt
as to its applicability in Canada.
c fm/historyof nhlpa executivedirectors.
45. NHLPA, supra note 43.
46. James Baillie, An Investigation into the Collective Bargaining Relationship Between the
NHL and the NHLPA, 1994-2005 17 (August 2005) (unpublished Master's thesis, Queen's
University) (on file with the Industrial Relations Center, Queen's University), available at
http://irc.queensu.ca/articies/an-investigation-into-the-collective-bargaining-relationship-between-the-
nhl-and-the-nhlpa- 1994-2005.
47. CBA, supra note 6, at pmbl., art. 2.1. Article 2.1 restates similar language found in the
Preamble. See generally id. at art. 2. 1.
48. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
49. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 240 (2d ed. 1998).
50. Id. at 250.
51. See generally American League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
52. Aubut, supra note 3, at 190.
53. The NLRA also specifies that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection .... 29 U.S.C. § 157.
54. § 158.
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With respect to extraterritoriality, a situation arose that is worth looking at
and analyzing here: it occurred in October 2005, during the lockout that was
ordered by the NHL. At the time it did not appear that the labor dispute,
which had already led to the cancellation of the 2004-2005 hockey season, was
going to be resolved quickly. The NHL was therefore considering the
possibility of using replacement players for the 2005-2006 season. Under the
NLRA, it would have been possible, in accordance with a complex legislative
mechanism, to use replacement workers, or "scabs" in the case of a deadlock
in negotiations. 55 The NHL may, in fact, only have wanted to put pressure on
the players by reminding them that it could resort to such action. In any case,
the NHLPA reacted to this threat by turning to Quebec law, which has
included anti-scab provisions since 1977,56 and applying to be certified to
represent all players in the Montreal Canadiens hockey club.57 Lawyers for
the Montreal Canadiens and the NHL argued that the parties concerned-the
NHL and the NHLPA-had been subject to the NLRA for over forty years,
and that the NLRA had extraterritorial scope, whereas the Quebec Labor Code
did not. 58 This led to the application of the estoppel rule and, subsequently, of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens pursuant to article 3135 of the Civil
Code of Quebec. 59 Consequently, the Commission des Relations de Travail
(CRT) refused to take jurisdiction over this matter, referring it instead to the
National Labor Relations Board in the United States, which it deemed better
suited to rule on this dispute. 60 Moreover, it concluded that the certification
unit requested by the NHLPA was not appropriate, as it should have included
all NHL players rather than just those of the Montreal Canadiens hockey
club. 61 In the end, the NHLPA, which had wanted to use this means to
respond to pressure from the NHL, dropped its request for certification.
During the same labor dispute, the NHLPA applied for certification to
represent all Vancouver Canucks players under the law relating to collective
labor relations in British Columbia. 62 However, on July 31, 2007, the British
Columbia Labour Relations Board (the "Board"), in an administrative review,
reversed the June 2006 decision by a labor commissioner who had concluded
55. § 158.
56. Quebec Labour Code § 109.1.
57. See generally Association des Joueurs de la Ligue Nationale de Hockey v. Club de Hockey
Canadien Inc., 2005 QCCRT 354.
58. Id.
59. Civil Code ofQudbec, S.Q., ch. 64 (1991).
60. Association desjoueurs de la Ligue nationale de hockey, 2005 QCCRT, at 354.
61. British Columbia Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C., ch. 244, § 22(1) (2009).
62. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P'ship and Nat'l Hockey League, BCLRB, no. B172/2007, 6 (2007).
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that the bargaining unit in question was "appropriate" in accordance with
Section 22(1) of British Columbia's Labour Relations Code. 63 The history of
labor relations between the parties, and the particular nature of the
professional sports industry and of the collective representation and bargaining
system that had been set up in the NHL, were listed as the determining factors
in refusing the requested certification. 64
Could this decision, which in a way, grants priority to "collective
autonomy" at the North American level over collective labor relations at the
local level, be easily transposed into Quebec law? This could come up, for
example, if an application for certification on the part of players from the
Montreal Canadiens was once again brought before the CRT. A brief analysis
of all the arguments put forward by the parties and laid out in the two Board
decisions leads us to conclude that a ruling in favor of certification of these
players under the Quebec Labour Code does not appear likely, even though
such a possibility cannot be completely ruled out. It is true that the players
belonging to the Canadiens, the employer under the Quebec Labour Code,
may form a "separate group," which would allow them to be granted
certification, provided, of course, that the association applying for certification
was able to establish that it was representative of the majority of employees. 65
The main question nevertheless remains whether this certification unit would
be deemed to be "appropriate," that is, whether "this unit, in accordance with
the particular circumstances of time and place, [will] be considered to have the
attributes that would make collective labour relations truly workable." 66
Certainly, it must be recognized that the existence of the CBA, which has
the value of a signed contract between private parties, does not in itself
constitute a structural obstacle to the players being granted certification, 67 nor,
if the case should arise, to a collective agreement being negotiated between a
team and the association representing the players working for this team. These
steps are fundamental components of the legal collective labor relations
system, essential components that are undeniably of public order. Moreover,
the existence of an individual contract, or several individual contracts, does
not in itself undermine the right to certification requested by an association of
employees who would otherwise be legally entitled to it.68 However, the
difficulties that could potentially stem from the implementation of collective
63. Id. $ 76.
64. Id. 58-74.
65. Quebec Labour Code § 21.
66. MORIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 927. This is the authors' translation from French to English.
67. Quebec Labour Code § 21.
68. §21.
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labor relations within an NEL team, in accordance with the Quebec Labour
Code, in particular the fact that the CBA standardizes working conditions and
harmonizes salaries for all NHL players, were clearly pointed out in the first
Board decision, and these potential problems cannot be ignored. 69 The
decision rendered by the Board in an administrative review is unequivocal in
this regard. Ultimately, the Board decided to reject the application for
certification concerning the Vancouver Canucks players, citing the following
reasons:
Orca Bay is the employer, but Orca Bay itself is an integral part of the
NHL, just as the BC-NHLPA is an integral part of the NHLPA, and the
Canucks players, as a team, are an integral part of the hockey league within
which they play. All three elements - the employer Orca Bay, the union BC-
NHLPA, and the employee Canuck players - are well served by their current
league-wide bargaining structure. This is a crucial factor in our finding that
the applied for bargaining unit is inappropriate. If this circumstance were to
change, such that either or both parties were no longer well served by the
existing bargaining structure, it may be that we would have to revisit our
decision. However, in light of the present circumstances, we find that the
bargaining unit applied for is inappropriate. 70
Consequently, if the CRT was one day asked to decide on the
appropriateness of such a certification unit, it seems doubtful that the latter
would meet the standard criteria related to coherence in the group of
employees, the history of labor relations between the parties, the
organizational structure of the enterprise operated by the employer, its
geographical environment, and the goal of industrial peace, especially given
that the only requests that have actually been made for such certification were
made during the most contentious moments of a stormy collective labor
dispute between the NHL and the NHLPA. The contractual system, which has
been put in place and involves both a history of collective bargaining and a
collective sector-based employment contract, is functioning effectively.
Indeed, there is no reason to believe that its legitimacy or legality will be
challenged in the short term by the parties concerned.
To sum up, the fact that the employers' representative voluntarily
recognized the NHLPA as the players' representative and that a private system
of transnational and multi-employer collective bargaining was put in place,
merits some consideration. This process took place outside of the legislative
framework provided by American or Canadian labor laws, under which, as has
69. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P'ship and Nat'l Hockey League and British Columbia Chapter of the
Nat'l Hockey League Players' Ass'n, BCLRB, No. B 138/2006, 163 (2006).
70. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P'ship and Nat'l Hockey League, BCLRB No. B172/2007,1 77.
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been seen, the only authorized level of collective representation and collective
bargaining is that of the firm. The parties concerned thus created a system that
has made it possible to negotiate working conditions collectively at the
sectoral level, for all the players and teams across the NHL.
B. The CBA: Standardizes Working Conditions and Harmonizes Players'
Salaries Across the NHL
The CBA came into force retroactively as of September 16, 2004, for a
duration of six years. 71 However, the NHLPA has the option of reopening
negotiations after four years-that is, at the end of the 2008-2009 hockey
season--or of extending it for another year upon expiry, that is, for the 2011-
2012 season. 72 This highly complex document determines the respective
rights and obligations of all the parties concerned, but also, mainly, the set of
working conditions that apply to all NHL players and teams. 73 In short, the
content of the CBA contractually imposes a "minimum public order." 74
Furthermore, it binds the parties, that is, the teams and their players, to respect
its provisions, including those of the individual employment contract, 75 called
the Standard Player Contract (SPC). 76
The following subjects, among others, are covered in the SPC, in the same
order as in the CBA: drafting amateur players, 77 the specific parameters of the
first contract, 78 the process leading to free agent status, 79 signing the SPC, 80
salary arbitration, 81 the rules concerning "waivers" 82 and loans of players to
minor league teams, 83 training camp and related expenses engaged in for
71. CBA, supra note 6, at art. 3.1 (a).
72. Id. at art. 3.1 (b).
73. See generally id.
74. Act Respecting Labour Standards, ch. N.I-1, § 93.
75. CBA, supra note 6, at art. 2.1, Exhibit 1.
76. The SPC constitutes Exhibit 1 of the CBA. See also id. at art. 1. '"Standard Player Contract'
or 'SPC' means the standard form contract attached hereto as Exhibit 1 which will be the sole form of
employment contract used for all Player signings after the execution of this Agreement." Id.
77. Id. at art. 8.
78. Id. at art. 9.
79. Id. at art. 10.
80. Id. at art. 11.
81. Id. at art. 12.
82. "'Waivers' means the process by which the rights to a Player are offered to all other Clubs
pursuant to the procedure set forth in Article 13 of this Agreement and shall include Regular, Re-
Entry and Unconditional Waivers." Id.
83. Id. at arts. 13-14.
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players, 84 the grievance and arbitration process, 85 per diem allowances for
players, 86 the pension plan,87 group insurance coverage,88 international
competitions,8 9 sponsorships and licensing, 90 an anti-doping program, 91 and
the establishment of a "salary cap," 92 which is one of the distinctive features
of the labor relations system set up in 2005 by the CBA that will be examined
in more detail later on in this Article.
The NHL and the NHLPA in effect agreed to limit the expenditures
devoted to players' salaries, in proportion to the NHL's overall revenues. On
the one hand, for each season, the teams' payroll expenditures cannot exceed a
specified maximum amount, which is determined annually. This is what in
sports jargon, is referred to as the salary cap. On the other hand, again on an
annual basis, the CBA establishes a "maximum player salary." 93 The teams
must remain within the limits of this system when distributing their total
payroll. Consequently, salary negotiations between the player and the team
are strictly regulated by the mechanism set out in the CBA.
There are three factors that must be considered before the annual salary
cap can be established: Hockey Related Revenues (HRR), 94 the Applicable
Percentage, 95 and Benefits. 96 Once these factors have been worked out, it is
possible to calculate the salary cap, 97 as well as the maximum salary that can
be paid to any single player. 98
1. Calculating the salary cap.
The salary cap, or Team Payroll Range System,99 to use the exact term
84. Id. at art. 15.
85. Id. at art. 17.
86. Id. at art. 19.
87. Id. at art. 21.
88. Id. at art. 23.
89. Id. at art. 24.
90. Id. at art. 25.
91. Id. at art. 47.
92. Id. at art. 50.
93. See id. at art. 50.6.
94. Id. at art. 50.1(a).
95. Id. at art. 50.4(b).
96. Id. at art. 50.3.
97. Calculating the salary cap will be further discussed infra Part IV.B. 1.
98. Calculation of the maximum salary that a team can pay to any single player will be futher
discussed in Part IV.B.2.
99. The expression "salary cap" does not appear anywhere in the CBA, which prefers the term
"Team Payroll Range System." CBA, supra note 6, at art. 50. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a
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used in the CBA, establishes a direct relationship between the total payroll that
is available for each team and the NHL's HRR, which is the first factor taken
into consideration. Thus, since the 2005-2006 season, the total amount in
salaries paid annually to players has varied in proportion to a rise or fall in
HRR, depending on the year. A new calculation is made each year, 100 based
on a formula set out in the CBA.l01 In other words, HRR is used as a starting
point in the NHL's new system for calculating salaries. The term HRR must
be broadly interpreted and includes, among other things, "the operating
revenues.., from all sources, whether known or unknown, whether now in
existence or created in the future ... of each Club or the League ... derived or
earned from, relating to or arising directly or indirectly out of the playing of
NHL hockey games or NHL-related events..." ,102 In short, all NHL
revenues are truly included in the HRR, and can be redistributed to the players
in the form of salaries, as explained below.
The second factor considered when calculating the salary cap is the
Applicable Percentage. 10 3 Each season, the players receive a percentage of
the NHL's total HRR. As was mentioned above, this percentage increases or
decreases, in relation to a rise or fall in the HRR, in accordance with the
following distribution grid: 104
Applicable Percentage HRR
54% Under $2.2 billion
55% $2.2 to $2.4 billion
56% $2.4 to $2.7 billion
57% Over $2.7 billion
The third factor considered relates to the Benefits that players receive. 105
This includes all sums paid out in pensions; government programs, such as
salary cap does exist in the NHL. Id. at art. 50.1.
100. Id.
101. Id. at art. 50.5(b)(i).
102. Id. at art. 50.1(a).
103. See id at art. 50.4(b).
104. Id. at art. 50.4(b)(i). It should be noted that the Applicable Percentage must be readjusted in
accordance with the HRR if the latter are situated between two levels. Id. at art. 50.4(b)(ii). For
example, if the HRR came to $2.3 billion (half-way between 2.2 billion and 2.4 billion), a rate of
55.5% would be applied (half-way between 55.0% and 56.0%).
105. Id. at art. 50.3(a).
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social insurance premiums paid by the team, as the employer; compensation
under group insurance programs including life, medical, and dental coverage;
playoff pool amounts paid by the League; and individual performance bonuses
paid by the League, in accordance with Exhibit 5-B Individual "B" Bonuses,
of the CBA. 10 6 It includes, in fact, all of the employee benefits actually
received by the players. From this total amount, a figure of $6.5 million was
established for each of the 2005-2006 and 2007-2008 seasons. 107 The figure
established for each of the subsequent years covered by the CBA is $6.75
million. 108
Once this last factor has been determined, it becomes possible to calculate
the annual salary cap that will be imposed on the teams. It should be pointed
out that this salary cap (the "Upper Limit") is accompanied by a salary floor
(the "Lower Limit"). 109 Calculating the Upper and Lower Limits of the total
annual salaries that can be paid out by the NHL teams thus involves three
steps, and the final amounts are determined on the basis of the HRR, the
Applicable Percentage and Benefits: 10
Midpoint = [(HRR x Applicable Percentage) - (Benefits)] - 30 (the
number of teams in the NHL);
Adjusted Midpoint = Midpoint x 1.05 (adjusted by 5% every year to
account for inflation);
Lower Limit = Adjusted Midpoint - $8 million;
Upper Limit = Adjusted Midpoint + $8 million.
This means that, if, for example, the HRR came to $2.3 billion and the
Benefits were evaluated at $66 million, then, for the following season, the
Lower Limit would be set at $34.4 million, while the Upper Limit would be
set at $50.4 million, as illustrated below:
Midpoint = [($2.3 billion x 55.5%)-($66 million)] - 30 = $40.35 million
Adjusted Midpoint = $40.35 million x 1.05 = $42.4 million
Lower Limit = $34.4 million and Upper Limit = $50.4 million
Once the Lower Limit and Upper Limit have been worked out for a given
season, it then becomes possible to determine the maximum salary that can be
paid to any player for that season.
106. Id. at art. 50.3(a)(i)(A)(1)-(5).
107. Id. at art. 50.3(a)(i)(B).
108. Id. at art. 50.3(a)(i)(B).
109. Id. at art. 50.5(a).
110. Id. at art. 50.5(b)(i).
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2. Calculating the Salary Cap or Upper Limit.
The maximum annual salary is a new feature, introduced in the 2005
CBA. 111 Accordingly, the annual salary of any player, including individual
performance bonuses, can never exceed twenty percent of the Upper Limit. 112
Thus, for the example shown above, no player could earn more than $10.08
million for the season in question. In the case of a contract lasting longer than
one season, the maximum salary allowed for the subsequent seasons would
correspond to the maximum salary established when the SPC was signed. " 3
That said, in order to avoid confusion and, especially, a wave of salary
increases across the NHL, it is essential that the SPC, concluded between a
team and a player, specify the annual salary in terms of an exact dollar
figure. 114 Therefore, it is prohibited to state that a player will receive a certain
percentage of the salary cap."1 5 What would happen if total HRR went down,
leading to a drop in the salary cap, and if, the following season, a player
therefore earned more than twenty percent of the salary cap? It should be
pointed out here that the contracts are signed on the basis of a predetermined
rather than an indefinite term. The team must respect the contract, and thus,
the player would be entitled to keep his entire salary even if it went over the
twenty percent threshold set by the Upper Limit. 116 On the other hand, this
amount, paid out in salary, would be deducted from the team's total payroll. 117
This rule encourages teams to show restraint. They must, in effect, avoid
granting the maximum salary allowed a player so as not to unjustifiably lower
their room for maneuver in the years to come, especially in case overall NHL
revenues were to drop.
In conclusion, the system of union representation and collective
bargaining of working conditions that has gradually been put in place in the
NHL is characterized by its transnationalism and multilateralism and presents
a model of private regulation of working conditions. The collective
bargaining of working conditions is centralized at the sectoral level, involving
the owners of the thirty teams, the NIL directors, and representatives of all
the hockey players in the League. The CBA, signed in 2005 as the result of
111. E.g., id. at art. 50.
112. Id. at art. 50.6(a). It should be noted that the CBA also sets out the minimum annual salary
that can be paid to a player: $475,000 for the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 seasons; $500,000 for the
2009-2010 and 2010-2011 seasons; and $525,000 for the 2011-2012 season. Id. at art. 11.12.
113. Id. at art. 50.6(a).
114. Id. at art. 50.6(b).
115. Id.
116. Id. at art. 50.6(a).
117. Id.
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this bargaining process, aims to standardize a whole set of working conditions
across the NHL and to limit, through a salary cap or Upper Limit mechanism,
the salary that can be paid to the players. Thus, it establishes a compulsory
framework for decentralized bargaining relating to the individual employment
contract between the player and his team.
IV. INDIVIDUAL LABOR RELATIONS IN THE NHL
Individual labor relations in the NHL take place at the level of "the firm."
The negotiation of the employment contract between the player and the team,
which is intended mainly to determine the salary and duration of the contract,
must be conducted in accordance with the rules specified in the CBA. 118 In
the event of a dispute over salary determination, an arbitrator can be called
upon to settle the matter; the same applies, more generally, to disputes over the
interpretation or application of the CBA, or over the individual employment
contract concluded outside this agreement. 119
A. Negotiating the Employment Contract Between a Player and a Team
Apart from being subject to the CBA as a group, the players are also
individually bound to their respective teams-the real employer at the legal
level-by an employment contract called the SPC. Exhibit 1 of the CBA
contains the eleven-page SPC, and Article 11 of the CBA stipulates the
standards governing such contracts. 120 In particular, the aspects that are
negotiated individually between a team and a player are as follows: the annual
salary, set in accordance with the rules explained above, and in some cases,
bonuses and "non-trade" clauses. 121 The duration of the contract is also
negotiated on an individual basis, except when this involves a first contract
signed by the player in the NHL. 122 All other aspects of the contract are
already covered in the SPC. 123 Thus, by accepting the terms of the SPC, the
player "agrees to give his services and to play hockey in all NHL Games, All
118. The rules regarding negotiation of the player contract will be further discussed infra Part
lV.B.
119. CBA, supra note 6, at arts. 12, 17. Arbitration will be further discussed infra Part IV.C.
120. Id. at Exhibit 1.
121. CBA, supra note 6, at arts. 11.7, 50.2(b) (discussing bonuses). Pursuant to a nontrade or
nonmove clause, the team undertakes to not trade the player to another team for the duration of the
SPC. Id. at art. 11.8.
122. In such a case, the duration of the contract varies based on the player's age at the time his
SPC was signed. Id. at art. 9.1. For example, the first contract signed by a player aged 18 to 21 is for
the duration of three seasons.
123. Id. at Exhibit 1.
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Star Games, International Hockey Games, and Exhibition Games to the best of
his ability, under the direction and control of the Club in accordance with the
provisions hereof." 124
The obligations imposed by the SPC on a player are, among others, to
report to his team's training camp, at the time and place specified by the team,
in good physical condition; 125 "to keep himself in good physical condition at
all times during the season;"' 2 6 to play hockey only for the team with which
he signed his SPC; 127 to cooperate with his team and participate in all
reasonable promotional activities to which he is assigned by the team, as it
deems appropriate; 12 8 "to conduct himself on and off the rink according to the
highest standards of honesty, morality, fair play, and sportsmanship, and to
refrain from conduct detrimental to the best interest of the Club, the League, or
professional hockey generally;"' 129 and to report for practice at such time and
place as the team may designate. 130 Lastly, the SPC contains provisions
related to the fines and suspensions that the team may impose on a player who
violates the club's internal rules, 131 as well as provisions relating to salary and
medical expenses related to an injury. 132
Nevertheless, the principal issue of the SPC negotiation is still
unquestionably that of salary. Thus, the CBA set up, for certain categories of
players, a private mechanism for settling disputes-salary arbitration. 133
B. Private Arbitration as Compulsory Means of Settling Disputes Between a
Player and a Team
The absolute jurisdiction of an arbitrator appointed under the CBA varies
according to whether the subject of the dispute involves the player's salary 134
or the interpretation or application of the CBA or the SPC concluded between
the player and his team. 135
124. Id. at Exhibit 1, art. 2.
125. Id. at art. 2(a).
126. Id. at art. 2(b).
127. Id. at art. 2(c).
128. Id. at art. 2(d).
129. Id. at art. 2(e).
130. Id. at art. 3.
131. Id. at art. 4.
132. Id. at art. 5.
133. E.g., id. at art. 12.
134. Salary arbitration will be further discussed infra Part V.B. 1.
135. Grievance arbitration will be further discussed infra Part V.B.2.
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1. Disputes over salary negotiations.
In sports law, salary arbitration is a tool that is made available to the
parties in order to settle their disputes over the negotiation of a contract
between a player and a team. The hearing is held before an independent
arbitrator, with each party generally being represented by their lawyers, plus
the agent for the player, and the general manager or his assistant for the
team. 136 The arbitrator decides on issues related to the player's salary only. 1
37
There are just two professional leagues in North America that use this
system-the NI-L and Major League Baseball (MLB). 13 8 The National
Basketball Association and the National Football League have not adopted this
system in their respective collective agreements. 139
The NHL was the first professional league to introduce salary arbitration,
as early as 1970, followed by the MLB in 1973.140 The introduction of this
mechanism stemmed from the dissatisfaction generated by the option clause, a
rule that was inserted in the NHL's SPC in 1958.141 This clause stipulated
that when a player's contract expired, the team could unilaterally extend it for
the same duration as that of the previous contract, at the level of salary
determined by the team. 14 2 Since this clause was automatically integrated into
the player's new contract, it was thus possible for the team to continually
renew this contract without any real negotiations being conducted between the
parties.14 3 Moreover, at that time, salary disputes were submitted to the NHL
president for resolution. 14 The latter rendered an irrevocable decision, which
determined the salary to be paid to the player. 145 However, there was a real
conflict of interest since the president of the NHL was appointed, it should be
noted, by the owners of the various teams. 146 Finally, following a report
published in 1969 that criticized the perverse effects of the system on the
competitiveness of NHL teams among themselves, the players were able to
136. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 49, at 336.
137. Aubut, supra note 3, at 191.
138. However, there are significant differences between the two systems, which will not be
addressed in this study. See generally id.
139. Seeid. at 211-22.
140. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 49, at 336.
141. Joseph Weiler, Legal Analysis of the NHL Player's Contract, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 59, 70
(1992); Aubut, supra note 3, at 193.
142. Aubut, supra note 3, at 193.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. STERN,supra note 40, at 37.
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negotiate through their new union association, an arbitration system that made
it possible to settle salary disputes between players and their respective
teams. 147
a. Eligibility for arbitration.
Salary arbitration can be requested by the player 148 and, henceforth-a
novelty introduced in the CBA-by the team. 149 To be eligible, the player
must first be a member of Group 2,150 that is, a "restricted free agent."' 151 He
must then meet the conditions listed explicitly in the CBA: 152
Age at signing of first SPC Minimum number of years of
professional experience required to
be eligible
18-21 3 years
22-23 2 years
24 or older 1 year
To be granted a full year of professional experience, a player aged
eighteen or nineteen must have played at least ten games in the NHL during
the same season, whereas a player aged twenty must have played ten or more
games at the professional level under an SPC. 153 Lastly, the player must have
received a qualifying offer from his team beforehand. 154 This offer, whose
147. Weiler, supra note 141, at 70; Aubut, supra note 3, at 193.
148. CBA, supra note 6, at art. 12.1.
149. Id. at art. 12.3.
150. Id at art. 12.1(b).
151. If he is not an unrestricted free agent according to Article 10.1, or a Group I or 4 player, the
player becomes a Restricted Free Agent (Group 2 player), when his SPC expires. Id. at art. 10.2. The
other teams will then be free to offer him a new contract, but the team with whom he played
previously will have the opportunity to equalize the offer. Id. at art. 10.3. Otherwise, it will
nevertheless receive a draft choice compensation. Id. at art. 10.4.
152. Id. at art. 12.1(a).
153. "'Professional Games' includes the following: any NHL Games played, all minor league
regular season and playoff games and any other professional games played, including but not limited
to, games played in any European league or any other league outside North America, by a Player
pursuant to his SPC." Id. at art. 1. If a player is drafted at age seventeen, signs his first SPC at
eighteen, and plays in the NHL at nineteen, he will need a minimum of four years professional
experience before becoming eligible for salary arbitration when his SPC expires. Id. at art. 12. 1(a).
154. Id. at art. 10.2 (a)(ii).
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term is limited to one season only, allows the team to maintain some rights
over the player. 15 5 If the team fails to make such an offer, the player becomes
an unrestricted free agent. 156 The qualifying offer must be made by June 25
of each year, or the first Monday following the draft of the player's last year
under the SPC; it must also comply with the following: 
157
Salary during last year of SPC Qualifying offer
Under $660,000 110%
From $660,000 to US$1,000,000 105%158
Over $1,000,000 100%
After having received a qualifying offer, the player who meets all the
previously mentioned conditions can request salary arbitration, but only if he
thinks that he can obtain a more advantageous annual salary. 159 Otherwise, he
can simply agree to play the following season under the terms of the
qualifying offer or refuse the offer in question and not request arbitration. 160
In the jargon of the trade, he will then be characterized as a "hold out" or a
"striking player." In this case, the team can file a request for arbitration before
July 6 if it deems it appropriate to do so, or let the player continue to strike. '61
The striking player has until December 1162 to come to an agreement with his
team; otherwise he will not be able to play during the season in question. It
must be mentioned that the team can, at any time, offer more than what is
specified in the qualifying offer, which may lead to a short- or long-term
agreement if the player accepts it. 1
63
As was explained above, the team can also request salary arbitration. 164
However, it can only do so in two very specific cases. 165 First, the team can
155. Id. at arts. 10.3, 10.4.
156. For a player's status to change to Unrestricted Free Agent, the team must not have already
requested arbitration. Id. at art. 10.2(a)(iv).
157. Id. at art. 10.2(b)(ii)(A)-(C).
158. Id. However, the amount must not exceed $1,000,000. Id. at art. 10.2(a)(ii)(B).
159. Id. at art. 10.2(a).
160. Id.
161. Id. at art. 12.4(b).
162. Id. at art. 11.4. This is the "Signing Deadline for Group 2 Players." Id.
163. Id. at art. 10.3
164. Id. at art. 12.3.
165. Id. at art. 12.3(a)-(b).
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request salary arbitration when the player has rejected the qualifying offer and
has not requested arbitration himself. 166 In this case, the team must offer him
a salary equal to or higher than the last salary level agreed on under the
previously concluded SPC.167 Second, with regard to a player who earned a
salary of $1.5 million or more during the last year of his SPC, the team can
refer the matter directly to an arbitrator instead of making a qualifying
offer. 168 Thus, it can ask the arbitrator to grant a decrease in salary equivalent
to a maximum of fifteen percent of the player's most recent annual salary.169
It should be noted that, in all cases, the player is eligible for only one session
of team-elected salary arbitration during his career. 170  Similarly, a team
cannot request more than two sessions of salary arbitration per year. 171
b. The arbitration process and the powers of the arbitrator.
To be eligible for salary arbitration, the player must file his request by July
5 at 5:00 p.m. (EST). 172 The team, on the other hand, must take action before
June 15 or forty-eight hours after the conclusion of the Stanley Cup Finals,
whichever is later, again by 5:00 p.m. (in the case of arbitration involving a
player who earned a salary of $1.5 million or more during the last year of his
SPC). 173 All arbitration cases must be heard between July 20 and August 4 of
each year. 174  The NHL and the NHLPA jointly choose eight salary
arbitrators, all members of the National Academy of Arbitrators in the United
States. 175 The latter are appointed to hear the cases filed. 176 The hearing
takes place before a single arbitrator chosen by the parties according to a pre-
established process. 177 At least forty-eight hours before the hearing, the
parties must send both the arbitrator and the opposing party a brief that is, at
most, forty pages long (excluding annexes) detailing the positions, arguments,
166. Id. at art. 12.3(b)(i).
167. Id. at art. 12.3(b)(ii).
168. Id. at art. 12.3(a)(i).
169. Id. at art. 12.3(a)(ii).
170. Id. at art. 12.3(c).
171. Id. at art. 12.3(d).
172. Id. at art. 12.2.
173. Id. at art. 12.4(a). With regard to a player who rejected the qualifying offer and has not
requested arbitration himself, the team must act by 5:00 p.m., July 6. Id. at art. 12.4(b).
174. Id. at Exhibit 15.
175. Id. at art. 12.6.
176. Id.
177. Id. atart. 12.7(c).
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and statistics put forward to back up their claim. 178 During the hearing, each
party has a specified period of time in which to argue their case directly (the
"Direct Case ") and then refute the allegations of the opposing party or present
their rebuttal case. 179
Each party has a maximum of ninety minutes to present their Direct Case
and respond to the arguments of the other party. 180 The player, the team, the
NHL, and the NHLPA are party to the procedure and can be represented by
their respective agents or lawyers. 181 At the hearing, the parties can produce
any documents and declarations under oath to back up their allegations and
call the witnesses they deem pertinent, subject to restrictions specified in the
CBA. 182 The weight of the evidence submitted to the hearing is assessed
exclusively by the arbitrator and the latter is not bound by any particular rule
of evidence, except those listed explicitly in the CBA. 183 The following types
of evidence are declared admissible: (1) the overall performance, including
official statistics prepared by the NHL (both offensive and defensive), of the
player in the current season or preceding seasons; 184 (2) the number of games
played by the player, his injuries or illnesses during the preceding seasons; 185
(3) the player's number of years of experience in the NHL or the team; 186 (4)
the overall contribution of the player to the success or failure of the team in the
preceding season; 187 (5) any special qualities of the player, such as leadership
or personal commitment to the community; 188 (6) the overall performance in
178. Id. at art. 12.9(b).
179. Id. at art. 12.9(d). The order of argument depends on the party who filed the request, unless
the order is determined by the arbitrator or mutually agreed upon by the parties. Id. at art. 12.9(k).
180. Id. at art. 12.9(d). If the party presenting second introduces new substantive issues or new
players or "comparable players," the other party will have ten additional minutes for surrebuttal. Id.
181. Aubut, supra note 3, at 204; CBA, supra note 6, at art. 12.9(a).
182. CBA, supra note 6, at art. 12.9(g)(i). The following categories of evidence are
inadmissible: the terms of any player's SPC when he was not a "Group 2 Player;" the SPCs signed by
an "Unrestricted Free Agent;" the SPC of any player who has not been presented as a comparable
player; qualifying offers made by the team; offers made during negotiations; newspaper columns,
press game reports or similar materials; and any reference to walk-away rights. For further discussion,
see infra Part IV.B. 1.c. Any compensation awarded by a salary arbitrator leading to the use of the
walk away right by a club; the financial situation of a team or of the NHL; any reference to the
"Lower Limit" or "Upper Limit," as well as to the "Players' Share;" any reference to an arbitral
decision issued in summer 2005; and lastly, any reference to the salary information contained in
previous arbitration decisions. Id. at art. 12.9(g)(iii).
183. Id. at art. 12.9 (g)(i).
184. Id. at art. 12.9(g)(ii)(A).
185. Id. at art. 12.9(g)(ii)(B).
186. Id. at art. 12.9(g)(ii)(C).
187. Id. at art. 12.9(g)(ii)(D).
188. Id. at art. 12.9(g)(ii)(E).
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the previous season or seasons of any player(s) who is alleged to be
"comparable" to the player whose salary is in dispute;1 89 and (7) the annual
salary of players alleged to be "comparable." 190
These "comparable statistics" have been sanctioned by the arbitral
jurisprudence as the most important items of evidence, 191 and the arbitrator's
decision is largely based on them. The NHL and the NHLPA must jointly
create a comparable exhibit setting out the financial terms contained in the
SPCs of all players alleged to be "comparable" players for the arbitration
session; 192 this involves players who have signed their current contract as a
restricted free agent. Moreover, for a player to be used by the arbitrator as a
comparable player, the parties must necessarily refer to him in their briefs. 193
Finally, the arbitrator renders his or her decision not later than forty-eight
hours after the hearing is adjourned. 194 The arbitrator's decision typically
includes the salary to be paid to the player, 195 the duration of the contract
between the player and the team, 196 a "minor league clause," 197 if applicable,
and the reasons supporting the decision. 198 The parties must comply with the
orders issued by the arbitrator and draft the SPC accordingly. 199 Lastly, each
party pays for the expenses generated by their own representation and shares
equally the responsibility to reimburse the cost of the arbitration process. 200
c. The Walk-Away Right.
Although the arbitral decision is imperative, the team can refuse to comply
189. Id. at art. 12.9(g)(ii)(F).
190. Id. at art. 12.9(g)(ii)(G).
191. Daniel Dumais et al., Prdsentation sur L'Arbitration Salariale at the Conference Heenan
Blaikie (April 2006) (unpublished).
192. CBA, supra note 6, at art. 12.9(g)(v).
193. Id. at art. 12.9(g)(ii)(G).
194. Id. at art. 12.9(n)(i).
195. Id. at art. 12.9(n)(ii)(B). The arbitrator can decide to award the player a salary equal to one
of the two offers made by the parties or any amount between the two offers. Id.
196. Id. at art. 12.9(n)(ii)(A). The term will be one year or two years, based on the player's
decision, in the case where the team filed for arbitration; or based on the team's decision, in the case
where the player filed for arbitration. Id. It should be noted that if the player reaches full autonomy,
"Group 3 Player" status at the end of the season following the arbitration session, the team will not be
able to decide on a two-year term. Id. at art. 12.9(c).
197. Id. at art. 12.9(n)(ii)(C).
198. Id. at art. 12.9(n)(ii)(D).
199. Id. at art. 12.5(a).
200. Id. at art. 12.9(o).
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with it under certain circumstances. 20 1 However, the player does not have this
prerogative. 20 2 The Walk- Away Right exists only when it is the player who
filed for arbitration. 20 3 Moreover, the team is entitled to exercise
its right to walk away only if the player obtains an annual salary of
$1,042,173 or more at the close of the arbitration session.20 4 This right is
usually exercised when the team considers that the salary awarded to the
player is too high in relation to what it is prepared to pay.
Nevertheless, the direct consequences of exercising this right are as
follows: (1) if the duration of the SPC submitted to arbitration was one season
only, the player will become an unrestricted free agent;20 5 he will then be in a
position to negotiate with any other team, including that which used the Walk-
Away Right; and (2) if the duration of the SPC covered by the arbitral decision
was two seasons, the Walk-Away Right will only apply to the second season,
such that the SPC will consequently become a one-season contract; after that
season, the player will become an unrestricted free agent; he will then be in a
position to offer his services to a team of his choice. 20 6
In both cases, the team must exercise its Walk-Away Right within forty-
eight hours following the decision rendered by the arbitrator. 20 7 On the other
hand, where the team must attend subsequent salary arbitration sessions with
one or more players and still has a Walk Away Right, it can exercise this right
within forty-eight hours following the last arbitral decision rendered in these
cases, since this will allow it to decide for which player, if any, to use its Walk
Away Right. 208
201. See id. at art. 12.10.
202. See id. at art. 12.10(e).
203. Id.
204. Id. at art. 12.10(a). This amount is raised proportionally, based on the average salary set in
the NHL as of the 2007-2008 season. Id. at art. 12.10(d).
205. Id. at art. 12.10(a).
206. Id. at art. 12.10(b).
207. Id. at art. 12.10(a).
208. Id.
20091
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Lastly, the number of Walk Away Rights authorized per season and for
each team depends on the volume of cases filed by its players:20 9
Number of Walk Away Rights Number of players having filed for
per year per team arbitration
1 1 or2
2 3 or 4
3 5 or more
2. Disputes over the interpretation and application of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and the Standard Player Contract.
Grievance arbitration should be distinguished from salary arbitration,
mainly because the outcome sought by this mechanism is not the same. In
labor law, grievance arbitration is the judicial means of settling all disputes
between an employer and a certified union over the interpretation and
application of a collective labor agreement. 210 The CBA, for its part, defines
the term "grievance" as follows:
any dispute involving the interpretation or application of, or compliance
with, any provision of this Agreement, including any SPC. All Grievances will
be resolved exclusively in accordance with the procedure set forth in this
Article, except wherever another method of dispute resolution is set forth
elsewhere in this Agreement. 211
Some specific grievances will be subject exclusively to the mechanism of
Article 48.212 For all other grievances, the NHL and the NHLPA are the only
authorized initiators. 213 The player involved in a grievance does not have to
be bound by an SPC at the time the grievance arises or when it is filed or
209. Id. at art. 12.10(c).
210. MORINETAL, supranote 11, at 1140.
211. CBA, supra note 6, at art. 17.1.
212. A "System Grievance" is any dispute involving the interpretation or application of or
compliance with the provisions of Article 49 Player Compensation Cost Redistribution System,
Article 50 Team Payroll Range System, those provisions of Article 26 No Circumvention, Article 9
Entry Level Compensation, Article 10 Free Agency, and any other articles in which the grievance
resolution could affect the interpretation or application of the provisions of Article 49 or 50. Id. at
art. 48.1.
213. Id. at art. 17.2(a). A grievance should be initiated within sixty days, from the date of the
events giving rise to the grievance or sixty days from the date when the parties learned or should have
learned the facts giving rise to the grievance. Id. at art. 17.2(b).
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heard. 214 Written notice of the grievance must be sent to the opposing party
by facsimile; the notice must put forward the reasons the grievance was filed,
explanations concerning the CBA provisions, which have been violated, and a
report detailing the solutions envisaged. 215  After being served with a
grievance, the opposing party has ten days to respond; 216 it can either
acknowledge or deny the alleged facts. 217
At this stage, only the parties involved in the grievance participate in the
process and continue to do so until the case is brought before the grievance
arbitrator. However, before proceeding to hearing, the parties must first seek
to settle their disputes before the Grievance Committee. 2 18 This involves a
meeting between the NHL and the NHLPA once a month following the day
the grievance was filed, in an effort to settle the dispute before resorting to an
arbitrator.219  The discussions and offers of settlement made during this
meeting are not admitted as evidence before the arbitrator, if the process goes
that far.220 If the grievance is not resolved between the parties during this
meeting, the grieving party can bring the case before a grievance arbitrator.
221
Just as for salary arbitration, the grievance arbitrator, jointly appointed by the
parties, must be a member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. 222 The
arbitrator renders his or her decision within thirty days following the hearing;
he or she has the power to interpret and apply the CBA provisions, including
the players' SPCs. 223 However, the arbitrator must not add to, subtract from,
or alter in any way the provisions of the CBA or any SPC. 224 Lastly, the
decision of the grievance arbitrator is final, without possible appeal, that is, it
puts an end to the dispute and is binding on the parties.225
214. Id. at art. 17.2(b).
215. Id. at art. 17.3(a).
216. Id. at art. 17.3(b).
217. Id. at art. 17.3(c).
218. Id. at art. 17.4(d). However, in some exceptional cases, called "Expedited Arbitration," the
parties may be exempt from this process. Id. at arts. 17.4 (d), 17.17.
219. Id. at art. 17.4(a).
220. Id. at art. 17.4(b).
221. Id. at art. 17.5.
222. Id. at art. 17.6. The selection process of this arbitrator is specified in Article 17.6. Id. The
grievance hearing is governed by Articles 17.8 and 17.9. Id. at arts. 17-18.
223. Id. at art. 17.13.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The labor relations system that has been set up in the NHL is certainly
interesting from a theoretical perspective and contains approaches that are
worth exploring further, given the contemporary and fundamental issues
currently faced by labor law. Thus, due to its particular nature, this system
differs considerably from the international framework agreements concluded
between international union federations and transnational companies, even
though a number of convergent aspects can be observed. 226 First, this system
was constructed on a voluntary basis, since the NHL accepted the NHLPA as
the players' representative and negotiated a collective agreement that
determines the working conditions for all players across the NHL. In this
sense, the system that has been set up precedes national legislation on
collective labor relations, since the latter's norms and effective
implementation do not generally cover the transnational dimension of NHL
activities and the labor relations between the players and the teams, or the
multi-employer nature that transcends such laws. In fact, the working
conditions stipulated in the CBA must be respected by the thirty teams and all
of the players in the NHL. Having been negotiated at the global level rather
than at the local level, the working conditions constitute the required point of
reference for individualized negotiation between a team and a player. Such is
the predominant legal impact of this truly collective contract. And while, on
the whole, the CBA is intended to standardize working conditions, the rules
relating to the establishment of a real salary cap, 227 in effect, harmonize
salaries across the NHL. Lastly, a private mechanism for salary and grievance
arbitration has been developed, 228 thus ensuring the binding effect and
enforceability of CBA provisions.
In other words, the working conditions observed in the CBA are the net
result of an advanced process of multi-employer collective bargaining. The
provisions that it contains are contractually binding, fully and
comprehensively on multiple employers-the thirty teams in the NHL-in
their relations with some of their employees-the players of the NHL-in a
specific industry-a professional sports league-spanning across North
America in two different countries.
The professional sports industry in North America is certainly a world in
itself. Without harboring too many illusions, it is nevertheless our view that
226. Rende-Claude Drouin, Les accords-cadres internationaux: enjeux et portge d'une
n~gociation collective transnationale, 47 CAHIERS DE DROIT 703, 703 (2006).
227. CBA, supra note 6, at art. 40.
228. Id. at arts. 11, 17.
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this trans American model of "collective autonomy"-an enlightened
example of "legal pluralism"-represented by the NHL's labor relations
system, can serve as an inspiration to other industries wishing to follow its
example.

